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Abstract
We consider the Rothschild-Stiglitz model of insurance but without the ex-
clusivity constraint. It turns out that there always exists a unique equilibrium,
in which the reliable and unreliable consumers take out a primary insurance
up to its quantity limit, and the unreliable take out further secondary insur-
ance at a higher premium. We provide a simple proof of this result (extended
to multiple types of consumers) with the hope that it may be pedagogically
useful.
KeyWords: non-exclusive insurance, free entry, adverse selection, primary-
secondary insurance.
JEL Classication: D43, D82, D86
1 Introduction
Rothschild and Stiglitz ([8]) famously described a model of adverse selection in in-
surance markets in which rms could set quantity limits in order to hold down the
number of unreliable clients they might have to face. They assumed that rms
could demand exclusivity from their clients, and focused attention on a separating
equilibrium in which reliable and unreliable clients took out completely di¤erent
contracts. This separating equilibrium often did not exist, but was unique when it
did.
Many di¤erent authors, starting with Jaynes ([7]) and including several others
(see, e.g., [1], [2], [3], [5], [6], and the references therein) considered dropping the
Stony Brook Center for Game Theory; and Cowles Foundation, Yale University.
yCowles Foundation, Yale University; and Santa Fe Institute.
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exclusivity constraint in specic economic contexts, and pointed to a di¤erent equi-
librium in which both types take out a common primary insurance up to its quantity
limit, and then the unreliable take out a further secondary insurance on their own at
higher premium1. Two recent papers (see Attar et al [3] and Stiglitz et al [9]) show
that this primary-secondary equilibrium always exists and is unique. The model in
[3] is more general than that of Rothschild-Stiglitz (see Remark 5), while in [9] rms
are permitted to use far more complex strategies than in Rothschild-Stiglitz.
In this paper, we go back to the basic model of Rothschild-Stiglitz, with just one
amendment: contracts o¤ered by rms are no longer exclusive, so that a consumer
may take out contracts from as many rms as he likes. In all other respects, our
model is no di¤erent from that of Rothschild-Stiglitz. This enables us to give a simple
proof of the existence and uniqueness of primary-secondary insurance equilibrium
(extended, in a natural manner, to any number of consumer-types, provided they
can be ranked in terms of their reliability), which we hope will be of interest, at least
from the pedagogical standpoint.
2 The Model
We describe the simplest model of insurance, in which each consumer begins with an
endowment of one unit of the consumption good in her good (no-accident) state and
nothing in her bad (accident) state. An insurance contract (;Q) ; where2  2 R++
and Q 2 R++; allows any consumer to choose any non-negative amount z  Q of
insurance, by paying a premium z in both states in order to receive nothing in her
good state and z in her bad state. We suppose a xed interest rate, for convenience
taken to be 0, so that in her good state the consumer ends up losing z; but gains
on net (1   )z in her bad state. If the consumer has probability p of an accident,
then the insurance is actuarially fair (or, unfair) to her if  = p (or,  > p):
1Indeed, we ourselves pointed to this equilibrium (see [4]), albeit in a di¤erent setting, where
perfect competition substituted for free entry. To be precise, all conceivable contracts, most of
which were not actively traded in equilibrium, were priced in [4] by the invisible handof perfect
competition (i.e., by the market forces of supply and demand). In e¤ect, there was not just a
continuum of consumer-clients in [4], but also a continuum of supplier-rms. There could be no
question of an entrant rm upsetting the equilibrium, because its actions had no a¤ect on market
supply and it could not even be seen.
2By quoting exorbitantly high  and any Q > 0; a rm can ensure that no customer will come
to it, and thus can abstain from participating in the market (i.e., the strict positivity of Q does
not force participation). We assume Q > 0 because it makes for a cleaner presentation. (Allowing
Q = 0 would not alter the nal results, or add any analytical insights, but just necessitate more
notation.)
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Thus a consumer who takes out z  Q units of the insurance contract (;Q)
and begins with goods y = (yG; yB); will wind up consuming yG   z in her good
state, and yB + (1  )z in her bad state. As z moves from 0 to Q; her consumption
traverses the straight line segment with slope  (1   )= from y to y0 (where y0 is
obtained by setting z = Q): We denote this segment by y  !;Q y0:
Let S = f(;Q) :  2 R++; Q 2  2 R++g denote the strategy set of each rm,
consisting of contracts (;Q): Insurance contracts are non-exclusive: each consumer
may choose as many contracts as she wishes.
Given a strategy-prole  = (n; Qn)Nn=1 2 SN of rms 1; : : : ; N (where N is
arbitrary), we dene the consumption polygon () as follows. First let 1() <
2() < : : : < L() denote the rst-lowest, second-lowest, ..., Lth-lowest values
among

1; : : : ; N
	
; let Nl() = fn 2 N : n = l()g be the set of rms quoting
the lth-rate, and let Ql() =
P
n2Nl()Q
n be the total quantity o¤ered by them.
Then () is the polygonal curve in R2+ that starts at y0 = (1; 0) on the horizontal
axis; goes up rst by the amount Q1 () at the rate (slope)  (1 1())=1(); next
by the amount Q2 () at the rate  (1  2())=2(); and so on, getting truncated
at the point where it hits the vertical axis (if it happens to get that far by the Lth
step). More precisely,
() = y0  !1();Q1() y1  !2();Q2() y2  ! :::  !L();QL() yL
Since premiums ` are increasing with `, the polygonal curve is concave.
Let the consumer-types be denoted 1; : : : ; T whose population measures are 1; : : : ; T ;
and whose bad states occur with probabilities p1; : : : ; pT respectively, with 0 < p1 <
p2 < : : : < pT ; i.e., type 1 is the most reliable, and type T is least so. The utility
function of type t is denoted ut : R2+  ! R and is assumed to be continuous, strictly
monotonic, and strictly concave. Furthermore the standard single crossing property
is assumed, i.e., denoting consumptions in the good and bad states by xG and xB
respectively, we have: if t > t0 then, at any point (xG; xB) 2 R2+, the indi¤erence
curve of ut lies strictly below that of ut0 to the left of the point and strictly above it
to the right. A canonical example is given by ut(xG; xB) = (1  pt)u(xG) + ptu(xB)
for some strictly monotonic and strictly concave utility u:
It is clear that
(i) on account of the strict concavity of ut, any consumer of type t will maximize
ut on () at a unique point xt () 2 () (in particular, all consumers of type t
will consume the same bundle);
(ii) on account of the single crossing property, as t increases, xt () will advance
weakly on () further away from the initial endowment (1; 0); more precisely, at
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any level l of (); consumer-type t will take out strictly more insurance than the
more reliable type t0 < t, unless both have reached the quantity limit Ql () :
Given a polygon(); a consumer of type t who takes out insurance (zt1(); :::; ztL())









It is also clear that
(iii) the consumer will exhaust the better contracts before starting the lesser
contracts, hence z`() > 0 implies that zj() = Qj() for all j < `; and z`() = 0
implies that zj() = 0 for all j > `:
For ease of presentation3, we suppose that if zt`() < Q`(), then the consumer
takes out a pro rata share of the quantities o¤ered on level `; i.e. she takes out the
amount




of insurance from each rm n 2 Nl(): It follows that not only is the nal consump-
tion xt() a deterministic function of ; but so are the amounts znt () of insurance
that any consumer type t takes out from each rm n = 1; : : : ; N in order to get to
xt() . Now, recalling that t is the population measure of type t; the prot F n()
of rm n is










t ()pt = Revenue - Cost









the denominator is positive (i.e. level ` has active consumers), so that prot F n() =PT
t=1 tz
n
t ()[premium - unit cost]. Observe that, by the pro rata rule, every rm
charging the same premium will incur the same unit cost.





an equilibrium if: (a) no rm makes a loss, i.e, F n()  0 for n = 1; : : : ; N ;
3And, only for ease of presentation. See Remark 1 for the case where we allow consumers to
choose how much insurance to take out from rms o¤ering the same rate.
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(b) no entrant rm N + 1 can make a prot, i.e., there is no (entrant) strategy



















Theorem 2 (Existence and Uniqueness) There exists an equilibrium, and across
all equilibria the consumptions of the consumers are invariant.
We shall prove this in the next two sections, and give an explicit description of
the unique equilibrium consumptions.
3 Existence of Equilibrium
Denition 3 (Canonical strategy prole): Let i =
PT
l=i lpl; for i = 1; : : : ; T:
Let Q1 be the amount of insurance that a consumer of type 1 would take out at the
premium 1 if there were no quantity constraints on her. Dene Q

i inductively as
the amount of insurance that a consumer of type t would take out at the premium











i 1. Now take the set of rms to also be 1; : : : ; T;
i.e., one rm for each consumer-type; and dene  = ((1; Q






be the canonical strategy prole. (If Qi = 0; then rm i is understood to have been
dropped.)
It is worth noting that in the canonical strategy prole, the contract (i ; Q

i ) is
not taken out by any type t < i; and is taken out until the quantity limit Qi by all
types t  i: Moreover, for each Qi > 0; the premium i is set equal to its unit cost,
so all contracts make zero prot.
Lemma 4 The canonical strategy prole  is an equilibrium.
Proof. We need only verify that no new rm has incentive to enter.
Consider a potential entrant. If it quotes premium  < 1, then (by (ii) and (iii))
all types will go to it, taking out nondecreasing amounts insurance as we descend
the reliability ladder, so that the entrants unit cost will be at least
PT
t=1 tpt = 

1;
while its premium is strictly less, so it will make a loss. Next if it quotes  = i
for any i; then it gets the same mix of customers (by our pro-rata rule) as rm i
did in ; and therefore makes the same zero prot. Finally, if it quotes any  with
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i <  < 

i+1, it will attract only types i + 1; : : : ; T so that its unit cost will be at
least
PT
t=i+1 tpt = 

i+1; while its premium is strictly less, so it will make a loss. If
it quotes  > T , it will attract no one and therefore make no prot.
4 Uniqueness of Equilibrium Consumptions
Lemma 5 Let  be any strategy prole at which there is a non-empty set J =
ft : zt`() > 0g of active consumer-types on level l of (). Then, for small enough
" > 0; the strategy (l()  "; ") enables an entrant rm to come in and earn the
premium l()  " while incurring unit cost no more than
P
t2J tpt; which in turn
is no more than the common unit cost c of each active rm in  at level `: Further-
more, if J has at least two consumer types, and if the most reliable consumer in J is
not taking out the full quantity Q`() of insurance at level `; then the entrants unit
cost is at most
P
t2J tpt < c for all small enough ":
Proof. Denote by " = (; (("); ")) the polygon formed after the entry, where
(") = l()   ": As "  ! 0; the polygon " coverges to (): Hence, by (i), each
consumer-types optimal choice on " converges to her optimal choice in (): Since
all the types in J take out positive insurance at premium l() in (); they must be
doing so in " (for small enough "): However no one takes out insurance at premium
l() in " before exhausting possibilities at the lower premium (") available in ":
Hence all the consumer-types in J take out the same insurance up to the available
limit " at premium (") in ": This implies that the unit cost incurred by the
entrant from J is
P
t2J tpt: On the other hand, invoking (ii), the reliabilty mix of
consumer types at level ` of () is no better than at ("); thus
P
t2J tpt  c: In
addition, there may be some other consumer-types J 0 who also simultaneously take
out insurance at premium (") in " but then everyone in J 0 must be more reliable
than the most reliable in J: This further lowers the unit cost of the entrant and the
desired conclusion hold with even more force. Finally, if the most reliable consumer
j in J was not taking out full insurance in  and other consumers are present in J;
then (again by (ii)) these others strictly worsen the reliability mix in  at premium
l(); compared to the mix at ("); implying
P
t2J tpt < c:
Lemma 6 At any equilibrium, all rms make zero prots.
Proof. Any rm i making a positive prot must have unit cost strictly below its
premium. By Lemma 5, an entrant can charge an arbitrarily smaller premium and
yet incur no higher unit cost, thus making a prot and contradicting equilibrium.
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Lemma 7 At any equilibrium, all consumptions are the same as in the canonical
strategy prole :
Proof. Let  be any equilibrium. We shall show inductively that all consumer-
types t = 1; : : : ; T consume the same in  as in ; starting with type 1:
Assume that 1 < T . (The case 1 = T will be considered later.) We claim that
(a consumer of type) 1 takes out no insurance in  if, and only if, she takes out
no insurance in : For suppose she takes out positive insurance in  but none in
: This implies that the premium 1 () > 1 ()  1: Let an entrant come in
at  and o¤er (1 + "; ") : For small enough "; it follows from (i) and (ii), that all
types will take this contract up to the limit "; so that the unit cost of the entrant isPT
t=1 tpt  1 which is strictly less than its premium, so that the entrant makes a
prot, a contradiction. Conversely suppose that type 1 takes out positive insurance
in  but none in : Then 1 () < 1: However, by (ii), the unit cost of rms quoting
1 () is at least
PT
t=1 tpt  1; which is more than the premium 1 () they are
charging, hence these incumbent rms make losses at , again a contradiction. This
veries our claim.
In view of the claim, it remains to consider the case where 1 takes out positive
insurance in both  and :We shall establish that 1 () = 1 and that all of Q1 ()
is taken out by 1, and that 1 does not proceed further onto the second level of ().
Suppose that 1 takes out less than the full quantity Q1 () at premium 1 ().
Then, recalling 1 < T , other less reliable consumer-types exist and, by (ii), these
types take out strictly more insurance as 1 at 1 () : So Lemma 5 can be applied,
which shows that an entrant can charge an arbitrarily smaller premium than 1(),
and yet incur unit cost bounded strictly below c, thus making a prot (since, by the
denitiion of equilibrium, incumbent rms N1() at level 1 in , whose unit costs
were c; made no losses in the equilibrium  prior to his entry), and contradicting
that  is an equilibrium. Thus 1 takes out Q1 () units of insurance. Then, by
(ii), so do all other types; and the unit cost at level 1 of is
PT
t=1 tpt: By Lemma 6,
1() =
PT
t=1 tpt  1:
Next suppose that 1 wants to take out more insurance than Q1 () at premium
1: Let an entrant come in and o¤er (

1 + "; "). For small enough "; all types will
take out full insurance (post-entry) on the rst level 1 () and furthermore, by (ii)
and the fact that 1 + " < 2(); full insurance also from the entrant. The entrant
will therefore incur unit cost
PT
t=1 tpt  1; but earn the premium 1 + ", making
a prot, a contradiction. This proves that Q1 () = Q1:
Finally we turn to the case that 1 = T; i.e., 1 is the solo type taking out insurance
at : By Lemma 6, 1() = 1p1  1: Clearly 1 will not take out more insurance
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than Q1: If he takes out less (because less is o¤ered, i.e., Q1 () < Q

1) , an entrant
can come in and o¤er (1 + "; ") ; get full subscription, with premium 

1+" exceeding
unit cost 1p1; and thus making a prot, a contradiction.
Now suppose, inductively, that i() = i and Qi() = Q

i for types types i =
1; : : : ; l and consider type l+1 < L. Repeat the argument given above, replacing type
1; : : : ; T by types l+1; : : : ; T ( i.e., just drop the types 1; : : : ; l from the picture and
commence with type l+1 looking aheadon ()) to conclude that l+1() = l+1
and Ql+1() = Ql+1.
5 Remarks
(1) (Beyond the Pro-Rata Rule)When a consumer is indi¤erent between several
rms (;Qi)i2I , and wants z <
P
i2I Q
i units of insurance at the common premium
 quoted by them, we could let the consumer choose how much insurance to take






z from j 2 I. This would be tantamount to allowing the distribution of
z among I to be arbitrary (subject to the upper bounds Qi):However, in this case, we
shall need to be careful in delineating the expectations that an entrant may entertain
regarding the consumer-types it can attract. If its expectations are allowed to be
too optimistic, in particular if it can cherry-pick amongst all those customers who
like its contract at least as much as their current ones, then equilibrium will fail to
exist. Some tempering of its optimism is needed in order to uphold equilibrium. One
natural constraint is that the entrant should expect to get precisely those customers
who strictly benet by coming to it, i.e., it cannot cherry pick amongst them, but
must accomodate all. At the same time impose the additional constraint that, on
account of an implicit cost of moving, those customers who are indi¤erent between
the entrant and their current insurers will stay where they are. With this denition,
all our results remain intact by the same arguments (with the obvious changes). The
entrant could even turn pessimistic and make the assumption that, amongst those
indi¤erent to it, only the most unreliable ones will present themselves at its door
(alongside, of course, all those who strictly benet). This, too, will leave our results
intact.
(2) (Pretending to be Many Firms, i.e. Menus) We can allow each (incum-
bent or entrant) rm to issue as many elementary contracts (;Q) as it likes, i.e., al-
low its strategy set to be [1n=1Sn: This will not alter equilibrium. To see this, consider
a rm that issues (1; Q1); : : : ; (m; Qm) with 1 < : : : < m as part of a strategy pro-
le : Let the rm unilaterally withdraw any one of its contracts (j; Qj) :Amoments
relection reveals that the clientale it will get at (1; Q1); : : : ; (j 1; Qj 1) will remain
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una¤ected, while the reliability mix of the clientale it will get at (j+1; Qj+1); : : : ; (m; Qm)
will not worsen, thus not worsening the protability of every remaining contract. We
conclude that an entrant can make a prot via a menu only if it can make a prot
via a single contract. Moreover, if an incumbent makes a negative prot on one of its
contracts, then it must make a positive prot on another one of its contracts (since it
cannot make losses in equilibrium). But then by our standard argument, an entrant
can come and make a positive prot as well.
(3) (Mixing Exclusive and Non-Exclusive Contracts Destroys Equilib-
rium): Suppose, for simplicity, that there are just two consumer-types. An entrant
rm can always break our primary-secondary equilibrium  by the strategem of
issuing an exclusive contract that will lure only the reliable and enable them to con-
sume above their -level. (The unreliable are kept at bay, because the quantity
limit of the entrant is too restrictive for them). Moreover, as may be readily veried,
the entrants premium in this stratagem can be set higher than 1p1 + 2p2; hence
it will make a prot. Conversely the separating equilibrium 0of [8] can be broken
whenever the consumption of the reliable at  is better than her consumption at 0:
For, in this case, an entrant can intervene in 0 with the o¤er of the same quantity
as the primary contract of  and a premium that is slightly higher, get both types
to fully subscribe to it and thereby make a prot.
(4) (Welfare Comparisons) Clearly the unreliable are always better o¤ at
the primary-secondary equilibrium  than at the separating equilibrium 0: If the
reliable are su¢ ciently numerous compared to the unreliable, then it is easy to see
that they too will prefer  to 0; with the upshot that  Pareto-dominates 0: On
the other hand, if the unreliable constitute the bulk of the population, one can still
say that  dominates 0 from the majoritarianpoint-of-view.
(5) (General Adverse Selection with Ranked Consumers) The arguments
we have given do not depend on the particulars of the underlying insurance market.
Let us suppose that rms sell quantities of a commodity to consumers. Firm n sets
a price n and a quantity limit Qn: Consumers can buy from as many rms as they
want, up to the prescribed quantity limits. What is essential for our analysis to
remain intact is that the consumer types can be ranked in the same order 1; :::; T
in two senses. First, given any vector of rm o¤ers, the quantities purchased at any
price are weakly increasing in consumer type t; (and strictly increasing if the total
quantity limit available at the price is not exhausted). Second, we need to suppose
that the constant marginal cost ct of producing the good for type is also increasing
in t: See [3] for an excellent analysis, carried out in this general framework.
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